There are many serious conflicts on the African continent that the incoming Obama administration will have to deal with, most notably in Zimbabwe, Somalia, the Congo and, of course, the Darfur crisis. Incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has done well on report cards by human rights groups on Darfur. Obama, likewise, has averaged an "A." But the that was when both Obama and Clinton were legislators in the Senate -- two votes out of 100. Now, as executives, both have the ability to maneuver the engine of American power to act; both now have no maneuvering room on the subject of genocide. Special envoys, in administrations prior, have been appointed to the many troubled regions in the past twenty years or so and their record, collectively, has thus far been dubious, especially on the issue of genocide.

As the incoming Obama foreign policy team begins to think in earnest about how to deal with some of the most pressing conflicts around the world, it should probably rethink the role of "special envoys" entirely. At a December 16 meeting of the Heritage Foundation featuring Andrew Natsios, a former administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Bush Administration's special envoy to Sudan and Walter Kansteiner, a former assistant secretary for African affairs at the U.S. Department of State both speakers agreed that special envoys don't work. History will clearly judge the lack of response to the genocide in Darfur by the Bush administration, but both speakers' point on special envoys should be taken seriously by the incoming Obama administration which, no doubt, will have Africa higher on their radars than either the Bush or previous Clinton administrations.

Will the new Obama foreign policy team signal real change on U.S. response to genocide? Natsios argued that special envoys don't work because, in reporting directly to the president, they are competing with various bureaucracy heads for face-time. Natsios argues that for an effective response to a trouble spot in a region not directly affecting American security, a deputy assistant secretary of state -- for that specific conflict, i.e., Congo -- should be given an ambassadorial rank. That position (a "DAS" in foreign policy parlance), just below an assistant secretary of state in rank, would be far more effective than a special envoy. It would be a sea change if the era of a special envoy ornamenting an administration but doing little with regards to actual change should come to an end.

[Image: Nebraska Department of Education]